INTRODUCTION
This paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimum cost production of information useful for resolving incentive problems. An intermediary (such as a bank) is delegated the task of costly monitoring of loan contracts written with firms who borrow from it. It has a gross cost advantage in collecting this information because the alternative is either duplication of effort if each lender monitors directly, or a free-rider problem, in which case no lender monitors. Financial intermediation theories are generally based on some cost advantage for the intermediary. Schumpeter assigned such a "delegated monitoring" role to banks, ... the banker must not only know what the transaction is which he is asked to finance and how it is likely to turn out but he must also know the customer, his business and even his private habits, and get, by frequently "talking things over with him", a clear picture of the situation (Schumpeter (1939), p. 116).
The information production task delegated to the intermediary gives rise to incentive problems for the intermediary; we can term these delegation costs. These are not generally analysed in existing intermediation theories, and in some cases one finds that the costs are so high that there is no net advantage in using an intermediary. Schumpeter made a similar point, although he did not consider incentives explicitly: a "default". Conditional on such a default, the intermediary monitors the situation and uses the information to re-negotiate the contract with new interest rates and contingent promises. A financial intermediary must choose an incentive contract such that it has incentives to monitor the information, make proper use of it, and make sufficient payments to depositors to attract deposits. Providing these incentives is costly, but we show that diversification serves to reduce these costs. As the number of loans to entrepreneurs with projects whose returns are independent (or independent conditional on observables) grows without bound, we show that costs of delegation approach zero, and that for some finite number of loans financial intermediation becomes viable, considering all costs.
Financial intermediaries in the world monitor much information about their borrowers in enforcing loan covenants, but typically do not directly announce the information or serve such an auditor's function. The intermediary in this model similarly does not announce the information monitored from each borrower, it simply makes payments to depositors. We show that debt is the optimal contract between the intermediary and depositors. The result that the delegation costs go to zero implies that asymptotically no other delegated monitoring structure will have lower costs. If there is an independent demand by entrepreneurs for monitoring without disclosure of the information monitored, for example to keep competitors from learning the information as suggested by Campbell (1979) , then well diversified financial intermediaries can provide it (in addition to simple monitoring services) at almost no cost disadvantage.
Diversification is key to this theory, and it is interesting that because of the wealth constraint, diversification is important despite universal risk neutrality. To develop a more general intuition into the role of diversification, some analysis is presented of a related model with risk averse agents but no wealth constraint. Two types of diversification are considered in the context of two alternative financial intermediary models; one is the traditional diversification by sub-dividing independent risks, while the other is diversification by adding more independent risks of given scale. The latter is what Samuelson (1963) has termed a "fallacy of large numbers", because it does not always increase expected utility. This section may be of independent interest because it provides some conditions when the fallacy of large numbers is not a fallacy.
The basic model is outlined in Section 2. Delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary in the context of the basic model is analysed in Section 3. Section 4 explores the extension of the basic model to risk averse agents. Section 5 applies the analysis of section 4 to the model of Leland-Pyle. Section 6 concludes the paper.
A SIMPLE MODEL OF FIRM BORROWING
A model of risk neutral entrepreneurs who need to raise capital to operate a large investiment project is used to capture many of the aspects of the agency relationship between commerical borrowers and lenders. We specify a simple environment, and characterize optimal direct contracts between borrower and lender.
There are N entrepreneurs indexed by i = 1, .. ., N in the economy. For the balance of Section 2, we examine one of them, and do not use the index. The entrepreneur is endowed with the technology for an indivisible investment project with stochastic returns. The scale of inputs for the project greatly exceeds both his personal wealth and the personal wealth of any single lender. For simplicity, the entrepreneur's wealth is zero. Assume a one good economy with all consumption at the end of the period. The project requires inputs of the good today, and will produce output in one period. Normalize the required initial amount of inputs to one. The expectation of the output that will be produced at the end of the period exceeds R, the competitive interest rate in the economy. Therefore, the project would be undertaken if the risk neutral entrepreneur had available to him enough capital inputs.
The other investors in the economy are also risk neutral: call them lenders. To undertake the project, the entrepreneur must borrow sufficient resources from them to operate it at its scale of one. Because the interest rate is R, i.e. the lenders have access to a technology which will return R per unit of input, the entrepreneur must convince potential lenders that the rate of return which he will pay to them has an expected value of at least R. Each lender has available wealth of 1/m, thus the entrepreneur must borrow from m > 1 lenders. The capital market is competitive-if convinced that their expected return equals or exceeds R (R/m per lender), lenders will make the loan.
Let the total output of the project be the random variable -. Assume that -is bounded between zero and y<oo. The entrepreneur and all lenders agree on the probability distribution of y, in particular all agree that E;(y) > R + K (where K > 0 and is defined below) and that y =0 is possible. The realization of 9 .does not depend on any actions of the entrepreneur.
A simple information asymmetry is introduced which will make the loan contracting problem non-trivial. The realization of -is freely observed only by the entrepreneur.
With output observed by the entrepreneur alone, he must be given incentives to make payments to lenders. At the end of the period, he will pay a liquidating dividend. It is always feasible for him to claim a very low value of y, and keep for himself the difference between the actual value and what he pays the others. Let z > 0 be the aggregate payment which the entrepreneur pays to the m lenders.
If the realization of output is 9 = y, he then keeps y -z for himself. Because consumption cannot be negative the payment which he pays cannot feasibly exceed y (plus any personal wealth he might have, assumed here to be zero). To induce the entrepreneur to select a value of z > 0, he must be provided with incentives. To raise captial to undertake the project, lenders must believe that the expectation of the value of z which he will select is at least R. The entrepreneur must choose an incentive contract which depends only on observable variables and makes lenders anticipate a competitive expected dividend. The only costlessly observable variable is the payment z itself. Lenders know the distribution of y, and know that the entrepreneur chooses the payment z which is best for him given a realization y = y, and that z E [0, y]. If y exceeded R with probability one, then a full information optimal contract would be feasible-the risk neutral entrepreneur would offer an uncontingent payment of R. (See Harris-Raviv (1979) .)
It might appear that the assumption that y = 0 is a possible outcome of the project rules out any borrowing, because z = 0 must be feasible, and it does not appear incentive compatible for an entrepreneur to choose a payment z > 0 when he can choose z = 0 and retain the rest. However, we will allow contracts with non-pecuniary penalties: penalties where the entrepreneur's loss is not enjoyed by the lenders. This allows the agent's utility function to be defined over negative values of its domain without allowing negative consumption to "produce" goods. We will see that these penalties are best interpreted as bankruptcy penalties. Some examples include a manager's time spent in bankruptcy proceedings, costly "explaining" of poor results, search costs of a fired manager, and (loosely) the manager's loss of "reputation" in bankruptcy. Physical punishment is a less realistic example. Projects which could not be undertaken at all without the penalties can be operated using the penalties.
The optimal contract maximizes the risk neutral entrepreneur's expected return, given a minimum expected return to lenders of R. Let the function c, from the nonnegative reals to the non-negative reals, be the non-pecuniary penalty function, which depends on z, the payment to lenders selected by the entrepreneur. 
where the notation "arg max" denotes the set of arguments that maximize the objective function that follows.
Proposition 1. The optimal contract which solves (1) is given by +*(z)= max (h -z, 0), where h is the smallest solution to (P(y-< h) * E y[yJy < h]) + (P(y >: h) * h) = R.
That is, it is a debt contract with face value h and a non-pecuniary bankruptcy penalty equal to the shortfall from face, h, where h is the smallest face value which provides lenders with an expected return of R. The final inequality follows from the requirement +(z) _ 0 for all z. Combined with the result that p*(z) = 0 for all z _ h, this implies that + *(z) gives the smallest penalties such that it is incentive compatible to fulfill (1c), implying that k*(z) maximizes (1). || The necessity of a positive probability of incurring the non-pecuniary penalty means that even the optimal contract is costly. Entrepreneurs could be made better off without making lenders worse off if y were observable. In a one entrepreneur-one lender setting, where 9 could be observed at some cost, it would be observed so long as the cost were less than the expected non-pecuniary bankruptcy penalty, EJ4*(i)] =Ejo*(y)].
In a setting where it is not possible to make 9 observable to lenders at some cost, the contracting problem is not influenced by the number of lenders-a contract with one lender who loans one unit is equivalent to a contract with m lenders who each loan 1/rm units and the entrepreneur incurs a penalty of p*(zj)/m on the basis of payments zj to lender j. However, this is not true when costly monitoring is possible. By spending K > 0 in resources, a lender can observe 9, but other lenders do not automatically observe 9 as a result and other lenders cannot observe the payments by an entrepreneur to the lender who monitors. As a result, an entrepreneur and a given lender consider only the effect on a given lender's loan of 1/ m units when deciding between a contract with costly penalties and one that avoids the bankruptcy penalties by costly monitoring.
We analyse the impact of an information technology which allows costly monitoring of the exact realization of output, y, for each entrepreneur. This information costs K > 0 for each principal to monitor, and the cost must be incurred before the output realization is known to anyone, including the entrepreneur. See Townsend (1979) for some interesting analysis of the optimal contingent monitoring policy when the decision to monitor can be made after the entrepreneur has made a payment to a lerlder. This additional complication is not introduced because given some specified probability of monitoring it would not influence our results.
If it is possible for lenders to observe the outcome at some cost, there are three types of contracting situations possible. The contract can be as described above, with no monitoring. A second possiblility is for each of the m lenders to spend resources to monitor the outcome. Thirdly, the lenders can delegate the monitoring to one or more monitoring agents. The least costly of these will be selected.
If there were a single lender so m = 1 (rather than m > 1 as we assume), monitoring would be valuable if its cost were less than the expected deadweight penalty without To obtain the benefits of monitoring, when m is large the task must be delegated rather than left to each individual lender. The entity doing the monitoring ("the monitor") must be provided with incentives to monitor and enforce the contract. We assume that the actions taken and the information observed by the monitor are not directly observed by the lenders. It will generally be costly to provide incentives to the monitor, and below we analyse these costs. The total cost of delegated monitoring is the physical cost of monitoring by the monitor, K, plus the expected cost of providing incentives to the monitor, which we call the cost of delegation and denote the cost per project by D. To analyse the conditions when intermediation is beneficial (when the monitoring cost savings exceed the delegation costs of providing incentives) we must first characterize the delegation costs. If the intermediary could monitor at no cost, it could enforce contracts with entrepreneurs which imposed no deadweight bankruptcy costs on them. However, there would remain an incentive problem for the intermediary, because the payments it receives from entrepreneurs are not observed by depositors. The intermediary could claim that payments from entrepreneurs were low, and pay a small amount to depositors. We now extend the results in Section 2 to analyse the optimal contract to provide incentives for an intermediary to make payments to depositors. We later show that it provides incentives to monitor as well.
Let The intermediary uses the same decision rule in the decision to monitor as it would if its expenditure on monitoring were freely observable. This implies that it contracts only with entrepreneurs for whom the value of monitoring exceeds its physical and delegation costs, and chooses to monitor them. The minimum cost contract which provides incentives for payment to depositors also provides incentives for monitoring. This implies that the optimal contract between the intermediary and depositors is also a debt contract.
Diversification and the viability of intermediation
For a financial intermediary to be viable, three conditions must be fulfilled. The depositors must receive an expected return of R per unit deposited. The intermediary must receive an expected return net of monitoring costs and any deadweight penalties incurred which is at least zero. Finally, each entrepreneur must retain an expected return at least as high as he would by contracting directly with depositors.
Everyone in the economy is risk netural, implying that a complete description of the optimality of any feasible set of contracts is the sum of monitoring costs and expectation of total deadweight bankruptcy penalties.
A financial intermediary which contracts with one entrepreneur (and m depositors) is not viable. This follows, immediately from the constraint g1(y1) < yl, that the entrepreneur can pay no more than the outcome Yi, and the constraint Z' G1 = g,(yl), that the intermediary can pay no more than it receives from the entrepreneur. An entrepreneur incurs a deadweight penalty whenever Yi < h; an intermediary with one entrepreneur who pays gi must also incur a penalty of at least the same magnitude when gi y< yi H1 (and it is necessary that H1 ' h to provide depositors with a competitive return). The intermediary is not viable because it incurs at least as high a deadweight cost and in addition spends resources on monitoring.
The case of one entrepreneur demonstrates the potential hazard of neglecting the costs of delegation when considering financial intermediation. The per-entrepreneur cost of providing incentives to the intermediary is reduced as it contracts with more entrepreneurs with independently distributed projects. With independent and identically distributed projects, the per-entrepreneur cost, DN, is a monitonically decreasing function of the number of entrepreneurs, N, because deadweight penalties are incurred when returns are in the extreme lower tail, and the probability of the average return across projects being in that tail is monitonically decreasing.3
The argument in footnote 3 shows that for all projects with less than perfect correlation, the delegation cost for N projects monitored by a single intermediary is less than the sum of the delegation costs for monitoring proper subsets of them by several intermediaries. Increasing returns to scale from delegation cost savings is a very general result. The assumption of independence allows a stronger result. The expected delegation cost per entrepreneur monitored by the intermediary gets arbitrarily small as N, the number of entrepreneurs with independently distributed projects, grows without bound. This implies that the total cost (per entrepreneur) of providing monitoring converges to K, the physical cost of monitoring. This is Proposition 2. Proposition 2 demonstrates the key role of diversification in the provision of delegated monitoring. The intermediary need not be monitored because it takes "full responsibility" and bears all penalties for any short-fall of payments to principals. The diversification of its portfolio makes the probability of incurring these penalties very small and allows the information collected by the intermediary to be observed only by the intermediary.
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Proposition 1 characterized the optimal incentive compatible mechanism for financial intermediation, and this is the optimal incentive compatible mechanism with "privacy". It was the optimal mechanism when the agent monitoring entrepreneurs was constrained not to announce the values of the project outcomes he observed and could only use the information privately to enforce his contract with each entrepreneur. Proposition 2 shows that financial intermediation is, asymptotically, the optimal incentive compatible mechanism for financing entrepreneurs' projects, without imposing the constraint of "privacy".
If the number of entrepreneurs monitored is N = 1, then delegation costs are so large that intermediation is never viable. If N --oo, then expected delegation costs approach zero, and intermediation is viable whenever direct monitoring pays. There exists some N> 1 at which intermediation becomes just viable (when DN The importance of the diversification is not simply a way for principals to hold welldiversified portfolios. Principals are risk neutral, and are not made directly better off by the diversification. Diversification within the financial intermediary organization is important, and cannot be replaced by diversification across intermediaries by principals.
Correlated returns of entrepreneurs
The assumption of independently distributed project returns across entrepreneurs is quite strong. It can be weakened somewhat. Instead of independence, assume that entrepreneur's project returns depend on several common factors which are observable. Factors might include GNP, interest rates, input prices, etc. Since these are observable, they can be used as the basis for contingent contracts. There might exist futures markets for these variables, and the financial intermediary could hedge changes in these factors in those markets. An example is a bank's hedging of interest rate risk using interest rate futures. If there are not active futures markets, then the intermediary can write contracts with depositors which depend on the values of these factors, rather than taking responsibility for all risks. An example of this is matching the maturity of assets and liabilities by banks, which places all interest rate risk on depositors. In either case, the intermediary retains responsibility for (and potentially fails as a result of) all risks which are not observable.
The The intuition behind this result is that the intermediary must bear certain risks for incentive purposes, but that risks which have no incentive component because they are common information should be shared optimally.4 There has been a debate among various bankers and bank regulators over the desirability of allowing hedging in futures markets by banks. Our analysis suggests a reason why it is desirable.
RISK AVERSION AND DIVERSIFICATION
Diversification proved to be important to reduce delegation costs despite universal risk neutrality because of the wealth constraint of non-negative consumption and the asymmetry of information about project outcomes. The wealth constraint gives rise to a special type of "risk aversion". In this section, we investigate the role of diversification within the intermediary when the agents within the intermediary are risk averse in the usual sense. To focus on risk sharing issues, we drop the wealth constraint to allow any promise to be made good. A complete re-analysis of the model of Section 2 is not presented. This section does not present a realistic intermediary model, but simply a further investigation of the role of diversification in reducing the costs of delegation.
The basic set-up is as in Section 2, each entrepreneur is endowed with a project with outcome -i which is freely observed only the entrepreneur, which has zero as a possible realization. Absent monitoring by lenders, no incentive compatible payment schedule can depend on the realization yi, because the entrepreneur could always claim a low value occurred. For simplicity, assume that all agents in the economy, including the entrepreneurs, are identical and risk averse. Risk aversion implies that the payment to lenders will be a constant, rather than a random amount independent of -i, (see Holmstr6m (1979) ). This implies that, absent monitoring, the risk averse entrepreneur bears all of the risk from fluctuations in -i. This is inconsistent with the optimal risk sharing which would occur if yi were observed, and this provides a potential benefit from monitoring Yi. In this risk averse setting, we could introduce other actions, e.g. effort, which the entrepreneur could privately select to give rise to a more general motivation for monitoring. This would not change the essence of our results.
We focus again on delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary. A financial intermediary raises funds from depositors who do not monitor, lends these funds to entrepreneurs, and can offer improved risk sharing with an entrepreneur because the intermediary's monitoring reduces or eliminates the incentive problem. In Section 2, we showed that an intermediary monitoring a single entrepreneur would have an incentive problem just as severe as would an entrepreneur. Almost the same result is true here. Because depositors do not monitor the intermediary and cannot observe its information, incentive compatible payments from the intermediary to depositors cannot depend on outcomes, and will be constant. It is true, however, that a single intermediary and a single entrepreneur can now share yi risk, but this has little to do with intermediation.
Any lender who spends resources to monitor Ya can share risk with the entrepreneur without being called an "intermediary".
For a financial intermediary in an economy where everyone is risk averse to viably provide delegated monitoring services, it must have lower delegation costs than an entrepreneur. Equivalently, since risk sharing is the issue here, a viable financial intermediary which monitors many entrepreneurs with independently distributed projects must charge a lower Arrow-Pratt risk premium for bearing the risk of an entrepreneur's project than does the entrepreneur. This will carry over to more general settings, because if the intermediary can bear risks at a lower risk premium it will generally face a less severe trade-off between risk sharing and incentives, and can thus efficiently be delegated a monitoring task.
Two types of diversification

There are two ways in which an intermediary in an economy of risk averse agents might use diversification. They correspond to two different models of an intermediary. One model increases the number of agents working together within the intermediary organization as the intermediary monitors a larger number of entrepreneurs. The second model assumes that the intermediary consists of a single agent who monitors a large number of entrepreneurs with independent projects.
Beginning with the first model, assume that each identical agent ("banker") in the intermediary is risk averse, and that by spending resources to monitor, each banker within the intermediary can observe the information monitored by all other bankers within the intermediary. This implies that there are no incentive problems within the intermediary. The extreme assumption that incentive problems are absent is intended to capture the idea that there may be different mechanism for controlling incentive problems within an organization. This approach is followed in Ramakrishnan-Thakor (1983) , to generalize the risk neutral analysis we present in Section 2. This model leads to the traditional "risk subdividing" type of diversification. This type of diversification works because each independent risk is shared by an increasing number of bankers. For example, each risk averse agent will obtain a higher expected utility if each of N agents invests in a fraction 1/N of N identical independent gambles than in any single one of the gambles.
The second type of diversification, "adding risks", occurs in the second model where a single banker bears 100% of N independent risks, with diversification occurring as N grows. This is quite different from risk subdivision, because it is not a form of risk sharing at all. The total risk imposed on the agent rises with N, while with subdivision of risks it falls with N. Samuelson (1963) termed diversification by adding risks a "fallacy of large numbers", because it is not true for all risk averse utility functions that the risk aversion toward the N-th independent gamble is a decreasing function of N. Samuelson provides no analysis of conditions when this type of diversification is beneficial, and I know of none in the literature.5 We provide a partial characterization of conditions when the certainty equivalent of a given gamble is higher (and the risk premium lower) when another independent risky gamble is also held. That is, when is the per asset certainty equivalent higher with N = 2 than with N = 1?
We turn first to the relatively straightforward model of diversification by subdivision of risks. Assume that it takes one banker in the intermediary to monitor one entrepreneur, and this requires an expenditure in goods of K (or that the disutility of this monitoring task is additively separable). All bankers are identical, have increasing, concave utility of wealth functions U( W). By spending K to monitor their entrepreneur, each banker can also observe information monitored by the other bankers within the intermediary, implying that there is no incentive problem within the intermediary. Depositors are not assumed to be able to observe any of the information generated within the intermediary, and are paid a fixed unconditional payment of NR. As N-> oo, Ramakrishnan-Thakor (1983) shows that each banker bears an arbitrarily small risk, with perfect risk sharing within the intermediary.
The interpretation of this result is that the diversification which occurs when bankers within the intermediary can share independent risks does serve to reduce the severity of its incentive problem. This occurs because the incentive problem here imposes a constraint on optimal risk sharing, and if there is improved risk sharing within the intermediary (where incentive problems may be controlled directly, or absent as assumed here), then this is analogous to reducing the risk aversion of a single agent, which reduces the tradeoff between risk sharing and the provision of incentives.
In the second model, where the intermediary consists of a single agent, diversification by adding risks is at work. The intermediary agent monitoring N loans, receives payments from each entrepreneur and bears all of the risk because he pays an unconditional return, N-R, to depositors. The financial intermediary can provide monitoring and risk sharing services superior to an individual lender if and only if his risk aversion toward the Nth independent risk is a decreasing function of N. Put another way, when there is no wealth constraint an intermediary monitoring a single entrepreneur (N = 1) is equivalent to direct monitoring by a lender. Intermediation becomes potentially viable when the delegation cost (equal to the risk premium here) is reduced by the centralization of monitoring to a single intermediary. This is therefore equivalent to the conditions when adding independent risks reduces per-entrepreneur risk aversion, which are the conditions when the fallacy of large numbers is not a fallacy.
To provide a partial characterization of conditions when the per-risk risk premium declines, we initially focus on the case of two risks. That is, given two bounded and independent random variables gl and g2, when is the risk premium for bearing the risk of the bounded random variable l + g2 less than the sum of the two risk premia for bearing either risk separately. If both random variables represent payment schedules from entrepreneurs which a risk averse intermediary would voluntarily accept, both must have expectation greater than R + K, because the intermediary promises N-R to depositors and spends N K on monitoring. It will ease exposition to provisionally assume 
The expected utility of the agent bearing the risk of x1 + x2 is now expressed as EX V(x2).
The incremental risk premium for bearing the risk of x2, given that x is in one's endowment is given by the Arrow-Pratt measure for the utility function V(.). The condition for Pl+2< Pl + P2 is for V(*) to be less risk averse than U( ), or will not only place a mean preserving spread onto intitial wealth, it will increase mean wealth. To take account of the effect of this higher mean wealth on risk aversion, we augment the sufficient conditions described above with the condition for decreasing absolute risk aversion. This provides sufficient conditions for the "fallacy of large numbers" to be correct, rather than a fallacy, (for proof that this is equivalent to decreasing risk aversion, see Pratt 6. The risk aversion toward the second gamble is reduced by accepting the first.
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In contrast to diversification by subdividing risk, the value of diversification by adding risks depends critically on the form of agent's utility function. Given the lack of observability of preferences in practice, this limits the testability of this result on diversification when there is no binding wealth constraint. The results in Section 3, where the value of diversification arises only from binding wealth constraints, provide strong and testable results.
COMPARISON WITH LELAND-PYLE (1977) RESULTS
Leland-Pyle (1977) (L-P hereafter) develops an interesting model of costly signalling by entrepreneurs selling shares to the public. In contrast to the ex-post information asymmetry analysed in this paper, they focus on an ex-ante information asymmetry, where entrepreneurs know more than investors. This gives rise to an adverse selection problem, because if entrepreneurs of different types cannot be distinguished, all must sell securities at the same price, and there would be a large supply of securities by entrepreneurs with worthless projects. The model allows the entrepreneur an endogenous choice of investing in other assets or retaining equity in his project. L-P show that retained equity serves as a costly signal of the entrepreneur's information about value. It is costly, because in equilibrium a risk averse entrepreneur retains some "project specific risk" of his project which would be avoided under full information.
Some preliminary thoughts on a theory of financial intermediation are presented in L-P although no analysis is developed. They suggest that financial intermediaries might expend resources to observe entrepreneur's ex-ante information and use the information to offer to buy securities from entrepreneurs, offering improved risk sharing. Intermediaries might do this to capture cost savings compared with information collection by investors, or to solve underproduction of information problems analysed by GrossmanStiglitz (1980) and Chan (1983) . Although L-P do not mention diversification, they seem to suggest that the intermediary collects information about many entrepreneurs and then signals the ex-ante prospects of its portfolio using the same "retained equity" costly signal which entrepreneurs can use individually. Such intermediation will be viable only if the per-entrepreneur risk sharing cost of signalling by the intermediary is lower than the per-entrepreneur c.ost of direct signalling without an intermediary. This is analogous to the conditions for viable intermediation in the delegated monitoring model analysed above. It is interesting to investigate whether the types of diversification analysed in Section 4 facilitate intermediation here. In the process of doing this, we correct an error in L-P which was not criticial to their analysis of individual entrepreneur signalling, but which is central to our extending the analysis to diversification and intermediation.6 We present results in the text, and sketch the analysis in the Appendix.
The formal L-P signalling model analyses an entrepreneur endowed with a project which has a mean return observed only by him. It is common knowledge that it has a normal distribution with known variance aJ2. The entrepreneur and all investors have exponential utility (constant absolute risk aversion). The entrepreneur's preferences are common knowledge. Traded securities are valued in the market using the Capital Asset Pricing Model and public information. This implies that known market wide risks are "priced", while "specific risks" (those uncorrelated with the market portfolio) are not priced. The market will bear specific risks at no risk premium. The entrepreneur signals by issuing unlimited liability (riskless) debt, and equity at market prices, and by trading in the "market portfolio", with signalling conditions enforced by retaining a non-trivial amount of equity and its associated specific risk. This signalling is costly because of imperfect risk sharing-the risk averse entrepreneur retains a large amount of specific risk which could be sold off to the market with no risk premium under full information.
We introduce financial intermediation and diversification into the L-P model by assuming that there are N entrepreneurs with projects whose returns are distributed independently and identically and are independent of the market portfolio. (The results extend to the case where projects are correlated with the market portfolio, but independent conditional on the observed market portfolio). In the appendix, we demonstrate that the results of Section 4 carry over to the L-P model.
Diversification by adding independent risks occurs if the intermediary is modeled as a single agent who like everyone else in the L-P model has exponential utility. As is suggested by the analysis in Section 4, such diversification has no effect, because with constant absolute risk aversion the risk aversion toward any gamble is not affected by the presence of any other independent gambles. This implies that an agent signalling a given project will choose to retain a given fraction of its equity in a signalling equilibrium, irrespective of other independent projects he must signal, and that the marginal impact on his expected utility is not influenced by other independent projects he must signal. This implies that financial intermediation based on diversification by adding risks is not viable given the L-P model because the intermediary signalling costs will be just as high as an entrepreneur's.
Diversification by subdividing risks occurs if there are N bankers working in the intermediary who all observe the ex-ante information of N entrepreneurs, and signal by each retaining equity in the intermediary's portfolio. Focusing for simplicity on the case of bankers with identical utility functions and identical independent projects with mean ,t, and variance a-2, this implies that each banker in the intermediary retains a fraction 1/N of total equity retained by insiders, and an equal fraction of each project. Because all bankers can observe each other's information and actions, they face no group moral hazard problem. Because of their risk sharing, we show that each banker's signalling decision is equivalent to that of a single entrepreneur signalling a project with mean N,u/N = and variance (1/N)2No2 = o2/N. As a result, diversification by subdividing risks has the same effect on each banker's expected utility as reducing the known variance of specific risk of a single project signalled directly by a single entrepreneur. We show in the Appendix that this diversification improves the expected utility of the agents in the intermediary (expected utility is a decreasing function of variance), implying that diversified intermediation is potentially viable. Put another way, the intermediary's signalling costs are lower than an entrepreneur's, because the intermediary's costs are equivalent to the signalling costs of an entrepreneur with a smaller variance of specific risk. This analysis corrects the erronous Proposition III in L-P, which states that an entrepreneur's expected utility is an increasing function of variance, and would have implied that even diversification by subdividing risk was counterproductive.
The results of our delegated monitoring intermediation model are consistent with the extension of the L-P analysis to intermediation. In particular, if the ex-ante information about the N entrepreneurs who contract with the intermediary is observed by the N bankers who as a team are the intermediary (diversification by subdividing risks), then the "delegated signalling" costs approach zero. The implication of this is an intermediary with primarily debt (deposits) in its capital structure and very little outside equity.
CONCLUSION
Diversification within the financial intermediary is the key to understanding why there is a benefit from delegating monitoring to an intermediary which is not monitored by its depositors. The intuitive reason for the value of diversification is slightly different in the model with risk neutral agents from the one with risk averse agents. In the risk neutral model, diversification is important because it increases the probability that the intermediary has sufficient loan proceeds to repay a fixed debt claim to depositors; in the limit, this probability is one, and the probability of incurring necessary bankruptcy costs goes to zero. In the model with risk aversion, but no binding constraints on non-negative consumption, diversification increases the intermediary's risk tolerance toward each loan, allowing the risk bearing necessary for incentive pruposes to be less costly. The general importance of diversification in financial intermediary theories is demonstrated by the similar results obtained from our analysis of a Leland-Pyle signalling model of intermediation.
Financial intermediaries allow better contracts to be used and allow Pareto superior allocations. This provides a positive role for financial intermediaries. The delegated monitoring model predicts well-diversified financial intermediaries with a capital structure which is mainly debt (deposits), with despite this high leverage, a low probability of default. These predictions are in line with reality for most intermediaries. In addition, the insight that intermediaries must bear certain risks for incentive purposes has an important implication for the regulatory controversy involving the desirability of allowing banks to hedge in interest rate futures markets. Because interest rate risk is freely observable, it ought to be shared optimally, and permitting banks to sell such risk in the futures market effectively allows them to do so. Because risk sharing within the intermediary is constrained by binding incentive compatibility constraints, there is a reason to allow the bank to hedge against these risks (although a possible alternative is for the bank to force borrowers to do this hedging).
Commerical banks and insurance companies are the most obvious applications of this model. Another interesting application of the diversification by subdividing model is conglometate firms. To the extent that members of subsidiary divisions can monitor each others actions at low cost, the conglomerate can allow the managers of the divisions to share the risks which they as a group must bear for incentive purposes. In DiamondVerrecchia (1982) , it is argued that the risks which managers must bear for incentive purposes are the firm specific risks because these are not observable elsewhere. If the cost of within conglomerate monitoring is fixed, a possible implication of our results is that firms with high firm specific risk will be most likely to join together into conglomerates.
An interesting implication of the delegated monitoring model is that intermediary assets will be illiquid. This is because the intermediary is delegated the task of observing information about each loan which no one else but the entrepreneur/borrower observes. In one sense, such assets are totally illiquid, as the intermediary contracts to hold them and enforce the contract, rather than sell them. If the intermediary were to sell a loan and transfer the monitoring and enforcement to someone else, the acquirer would have to incur the monitoring costs again, duplicating the effort of the first intermediary. These costs would be in addition to any physical costs of transfering ownership. Adverse selection of which loan an intermediary chooses to sell could be another complication caused by the private information possessed by the intermediary. The centralization of monitoring each loan by a single intermediary will mean that there are not active markets for these assets. All of these phenomenon are related to the concept of illiquidity. The resulting illiquidity of assets leads to another reason why financial intermediaries might improve on the allocations provided by competitive exchange markets; see Diamond-Dybvig (1983) , where asset illiquidity is simply a result of the specified production technology. An interesting extension of these two models would be a model of the liqudity implications of private information within an intermediary.
Many "markets" for information services induce the delegated private information production analysed in this paper. Further study of the implications of this arrangement should produce new insights into financial markets and institutions, and possibly other types of markets and organizations.
APPENDIX
To focus on the role of diversification in reducing the signalling costs of an intermediary below those of individual entrepreneurs, we compare signalling costs for N = 1 and N = 2. We view the intermediary as equivalent to an entrepreneur with 2 projects. We assume that the projects of entrepreneurs monitored by the intermediary are mutually independent and uncorrelated with the "market portfolio", the one other traded risky asset in the L-P model. We follow L-P and assume that projects are so small that we can neglect the effect of adding them to the market. This implies we can alternatively assume that the projects are independent conditional on the market portfolio, because trade in the market allows optimal linear sharing of market risk, and L-P analyze only linear risk sharing.
Agents in the intermediary have identical known exponential utility of wealth functions, U( W) =e-bW where b> 0. Project i has returns xi + i, where xi has a normal distribution with zero mean and known variance o-xi, and ,i is known by the entrepreneur and intermediary, but not investors in the market. Given information which will be available to the market, the project is valued at its expectation, discounted by the rate of interest, r (because project is uncorrelated with the market, or alternatively, because investors are risk neutral). The intermediary chooses to retain a fraction ai of the equity in the ith project, selling the remainder to outside investors and also issuing unlimited liability (riskless) debt. Absent some sort of self-selection or signalling mechanism, there will be a severe adverse selection problem. L-P solve for a fully separating signalling equilibrium, with sorting based on the value of ai.
Using notation similar to L-P, define: 
